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Contract. Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 2002). The mere
existence of a homosexual relationship between two parties does
not impair their right to contract with each other for consideration
independent of the relationship.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The two parties lived together in a homosexual relationship
for approximately nine years before their relationship ended on
bad terms.' Doe (plaintiff) then filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive
relief against Burkland (defendant) alleging harassment and
threats. 2 Burkland denied Doe's claims and filed counterclaims in-
cluding breach of an oral agreement to share equally any property
acquired by either party during the course of the relationship.3
Burkland's counterclaims also alleged breach of an express and im-
plied contract, promissory estoppel, constructive trust, resulting
trust, and unjust enrichment. 4
A superior court justice dismissed all of Burkland's counter-
claims under rule 12(b)(6) of the Rhode Island Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure because they failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 5 The justice held that the counter-
claims arose from alleged agreements that centered on a meretri-
cious relationship between Doe and Burkland.6 The justice
decided the counterclaims were not viable because Rhode Island
law does not recognize a marital dissolution between non-married
couples. 7 The justice reasoned that contracts arising from a mere-
tricious relationship are void as against public policy.8 The court
then entered a final judgment for Doe, from which Burkland
appealed. 9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Because the superior court justice ignored the valid considera-
tion alleged for the property sharing agreement averred in Burk-




5. Id. at 1092-93.





land's counterclaims, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed
and vacated the order and judgment dismissing those claims. 10
The supreme court held that the parties' sexual relationship
did not constitute the consideration for their putative property-
sharing agreement.'1 In fact, the counterclaims contained no ref-
erence to the sexual relationship between the parties. 12 The coun-
terclaim, instead, alleged that Burkland agreed to "devote his
skills, effort, labors and earnings" to assist Doe in his career.1
3
Burkland alleged that he provided homemaking services, business
consulting, and counseling to Doe in consideration for the property-
sharing agreement.' 4 If proven, such consideration would not be
illegal even if the parties had lived together in a homosexual rela-
tionship at the time they entered into the contract.' 5 As long as
the alleged consideration was not illegal, a suit for enforcement of
the contract can proceed. 16
Furthermore, the court held, even if there was no enforceable
contract, the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment may apply to
prevent a person from retaining a benefit received from another
without payment for such benefit. 17 Burkland asserted that the
consideration he provided to Doe for nine years unjustly enriched
the plaintiff.'8
Also, a constructive or resulting trust may have arisen when
Doe acquired property in his name alone when there was an al-
leged agreement to share that property with Burkland. 19 Such cir-
cumstances could give rise to an equitable duty on Doe's part to
share a fair portion of the acquired property with Burkland. 20
Burkland's counterclaims alleged sufficient facts to conclude that,








16. Id. at 1094.
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CONCLUSION
The mere existence of a homosexual relationship between two
parties does not impair their right to contract with each other for
consideration independent of the relationship. As long as there is
alleged legal consideration, a suit for enforcement of the contract
can proceed.
Joe H. Lawson II
SURVEY SECTION
Contract. Lecours v. Lecours, 792 A.2d 730 (R.I. 2002). In a fam-
ily court proceeding, the court has broad jurisdiction over property
settlement agreements not merged into a final judgment of di-
vorce. Therefore, failure to object in family court to a proposed
modification of a property settlement agreement is equivalent to
consenting to the modification.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The family court found Norman E. Lecours in contempt for
failing to provide his ex-wife, Dianne Lecours, life and health in-
surance as stated in their final judgment of divorce.'
The divorce decree required that Norman Lecours, through his
business, maintain health insurance and a life insurance policy
equal to an amount sufficient to pay off the mortgage on the mari-
tal homestead for the benefit of his ex-wife. 2 The parties also exe-
cuted a separate "Property Settlement Agreement."3 The
settlement agreement was incorporated, but not merged, into the
Judgment of Divorce.4 The parties agreed that the property settle-
ment agreement shall survive the Judgment of Divorce as an inde-
pendent legal contract. 5
In September 1999, Dianne filed a motion to adjudge defen-
dant in contempt of the divorce decree because Norman (defen-
dant) had failed to maintain the heath and life insurance policies. 6
At a hearing, the defendant agreed to modify the settlement agree-
ment.7 The defendant agreed: to make Dianne Lecours the benefi-
ciary on an existing $50,000 policy, to apply for a new $100,000
policy for her benefit, and to provide medical insurance for her
life.8
The defendant never objected to any terms contained in the
order issued by the family court outlining the new agreement. 9
The defendant subsequently appealed the order on the belief the
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family court erred by modifying an agreement that had not been
merged into the divorce decree. 10
BACKGROUND
Section 8-10-3 of the Rhode Island General Laws" gives the
family court broad powers to "hear and determine all matters per-
taining to 'property settlement agreements and all other contracts
between persons who at the time of execution of said contracts,
were husband and wife." 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Norman Lecours argued that the family court did
not have jurisdiction over his property settlement agreement be-
cause the agreement was a contract, and it retained that character
because it was incorporated, but not merged, into the divorce de-
cree. 13 The defendant, however, failed to object during a family
court proceeding that modified the original property settlement
agreement. 14
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that because the family
court can exercise broad powers over property settlements between
husbands and wives, it was well within the power of the family
court to exercise jurisdiction of the modification of a property set-
tlement agreement. 15
The court pointed out that the defendant agreed to modify the
property settlement agreement at a family court hearing.16 Fur-
thermore, the defendant failed to object during those proceed-
ings.' 7 The supreme court stated, "the defendant's failure to object
is tantamount to consent."' 8 Defendant is barred from attacking
the validity of the new terms of the agreement because of his fail-
ure to preserve the issue for appeal. 19
10. Id.
11. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3 (1999).
12. Lecours, 792 A.2d at 731 (citing Bowen v. Bowen, 675 A.2d 412, 414 (R.I.
1996) (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3 (1999))).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 732.
15. Id. at 731.
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CONCLUSION
Norman Lecours's failure to object during a family court hear-
ing to modification of a property settlement agreement was the
equivalent of consenting to the modification. His failure to pre-
serve his objection deprived him of the standing necessary to ap-
peal the decision.
Charles M. Edgar Jr.
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Contracts. Saber v. Dan Angelone Chevrolet, 811 A.2d 644 (R.I.
2002). A breach of warranty of title may be proven by a showing
that a substantial shadow was cast over a title, even if the title is
later found to be legally valid. There is a point, however, at which
a third party's claim is too attenuated. Section 6A-2-714(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) allows deviation from typical
measures of damages in special circumstances. An automobile en-
tirely rebuilt from components from other cars and sold to the
buyer without disclosure of this information is a special circum-
stance allowing the purchase price of the car to be the measure of
damages.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
George Saber (plaintiff), a resident of Massachusetts, bought a
used 1985 red Chevrolet Corvette with an automatic transmission
from defendant, Dan Angelone Chevrolet, on February 7, 1990.1
Between March 1990 and April 1992, several problems arose with
the car. 2 In light of these problems, plaintiff conducted a title
search to investigate the history of the car and discovered that the
title application for the car described it as black with a manual
transmission.3 Through his attorney, plaintiff contacted the Mas-
sachusetts State Police.4
Lieutenant Joseph Costa (Lt. Costa) inspected the car and
found a number of discrepancies related to the vehicle identifica-
tion number (VIN) and various parts of the car.5 The plate con-
taining the VIN, located on the window downpost, was blistered
and painted over; the numbers on the car's frame, engine and
transmission did not match the VIN on the plate; and a mylar
sticker containing the VIN was missing from the door of the car.6
In light of these findings, Lt. Costa suspected that some of the car
parts were stolen.7 The next day, plaintiff drove the car to the
state police barracks in North Dartmouth, voluntarily leaving the
car and dropping off the keys.8 At trial, Lt. Costa testified that
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plaintiff could not get the car back because it was impounded.9
Later investigation revealed the car had been destroyed in a fire
and rebuilt from parts of various other cars, none of which were
stolen.' 0 This information, however, had not been disclosed to
plaintiff when he purchased the car, and it was unclear whether
defendant was aware of these facts when he sold plaintiff the car."I
Plaintiff filed an action in superior court for damages for negli-
gence and breach of contract. 12 The complaint was amended to in-
clude counts for deceptive trade practices, misrepresentation,
revocation of acceptance, and violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 of
the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act. 13 Plaintiff did not expressly
include a breach of warranty in his complaint, but as support for
his claim of negligence, he alleged that he had not been given good
title to the car.' 4 At the close of plaintiffs case, defendant moved
for judgment as a matter of law, contending that there could be no
breach of warranty because the car was not stolen.' 5
The trial justice held that warranty of title may be breached
by impoundment by law enforcement and denied defendant's mo-
tion. 16 Prior to closing arguments, both parties moved for judg-
ment as a matter of law.' 7 Based on Lt. Costa's testimony, the
trial justice held that the car was impounded and for this reason,
defendant breached the warranty of title owed to plaintiff.'8 The
jury was charged with determination of whether plaintiff provided
defendant with sufficient notice under § 6A-2-607 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC).19 The jury returned a verdict for plain-
tiff.20 Defendant renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of




11. Id. at 647-48.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In response to defendant's argument that the breach of war-
ranty claim was not properly before the trial court, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court held that defendant had impliedly consented
to the litigation of the issue of breach of warranty by failing to ob-
ject to plaintiffs theory of the case. 23 Rule 15(b) of the Rhode Is-
land Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[wihen
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings."24 Though the amended
complaint did not include a count for breach of warranty of title,
the defendant's failure to object until after the jury was charged,
and had returned its verdict, amounted to consent to the litigation
of the issue.25 The supreme court also affirmed the trial court's
finding that the car had been impounded and held that plaintiffs
voluntary delivery of the car to the police was irrelevant.26
In reviewing the trial court's finding that the warranty of title
had been breached as a matter of law, the supreme court noted
that the UCC did not define good title.27 Observing that the term
was ambiguous, the court examined the official comments to the
UCC as an aid to their statutory interpretation of the meaning of
good title.28 Official comment 1 to § 6A-2-312 explains that one of
the purposes of the warranty of title is to provide a buyer with a
good title to prevent exposure to lawsuits. 29 The comment goes on
to abolish the warranty of quiet possession, but provides that the
disturbance of quiet possession is one of many ways that a breach
of warranty of title may be shown.30 Without ruling on the aboli-
tion of the warranty of quiet possession, the court adopted the posi-
tion that disturbance of quiet possession establishes a breach of
warranty of title.3 1
In considering the scope of the warranty of title, the court
noted a split of authority, and adopted the view that "a buyer
23. Id. at 649.
24. Id. (quoting R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 15(b)).
25. Id,




30. Id. at 650-51.
31. Id. at 651.
SURVEY SECTION
[may] establish a breach of warranty of title if a substantial
shadow is cast over a title, even if the buyer's title ultimately is
proven to be legally valid."32 However, in so doing, the court ac-
knowledged that "there is some point at which [a] third party's
claim against the goods becomes so attenuated that we should not
regard it as an interference against which the seller had war-
ranted."33 Here, although it was ultimately determined that the
car was not stolen and that the defendant did have and deliver a
legally valid title, the police impoundment of the car was not atten-
uated because Lt. Costa's suspicions, though mistaken, were rea-
sonable. 34 Impoundment by police sufficiently called the plaintiffs
ownership of the car into question so as to cast a significant
shadow over his title, breaching the warranty.35
The supreme court then reviewed the trial court's admission of
evidence of the repairs made to the car, concluding that their ad-
mission was not an abuse of discretion. 36 Defendant's appeal of
the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law was also
denied. 37 The court found that the trial justice had properly con-
sidered all relevant and material evidence and denied defendant's
motion for a new trial.38
Finally, defendant's motion for a new trial based on erroneous
jury instructions was also denied.39 Defendant alleged that the
trial justice's instruction to the jury that, if liability were estab-
lished, damages would be $14,900 was error.40 Defendant claimed
that plaintiff was not damaged, or alternatively that these dam-
ages were speculative. 4 ' Given that the plaintiff was dispossessed
of the car, for which he had paid $14,900, the court found these
arguments unpersuasive. 42 The fact that the car had been put to-
gether using components from so many other cars made it difficult
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting James J. White & Robert S. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, § 9-12 at 537 (4th ed. 1995)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 652.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 653.
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to assign a value to the car, other than the purchase price.43 Sec-
tion 6A-2-714(2) of the UCC allows deviation from typical mea-
sures for damages for breach of warranty in special
circumstances. 44 The court held that the hybrid condition of the
car was a special circumstance and therefore the trial justice's in-




A failure to object to a theory of the case that encompasses an
additional claim will be treated as implied consent to the litigation
of the issue, and the claim will be treated no differently than other
claims raised in the pleadings.
Police impoundment sufficiently calls a buyer's ownership of
property into question so as to cast a significant shadow over his
title. A buyer's voluntary relinquishment of the property is irrele-
vant to the issue of whether the property had been impounded by
police. A breach of a seller's warranty of title may be shown in
many ways, one of which is a showing of a substantial interference
with the buyer's quiet possession of the property. Here, given the
trial justice's finding that the Corvette had been impounded, plain-
tiff had made a sufficient showing that the warranty of title had
been breached. Admission of evidence of repairs made to the car
was not an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, jury instructions directing that, if liability were
established, the amount of damages were to be in the amount of
the purchase price, were proper under section 6A-2-714(2) of the
UCC, which allows for deviation from the typical measure of dam-
ages in special circumstances. Because the car had been entirely
rebuilt, the value of the car was difficult or impossible to deter-
mine. The court held that this was a special circumstance: there-




44. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-714(2) (2000)).
45. Id.
